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Abstract
Reversals in capital inows can have severe economic consequences. This paper develops a
dynamic general equilibrium model to analyse the e¤ect on interest rates, asset prices, invest-
ment, consumption, output, the exchange rate and the current account of a shift in portfolio
preferences of foreign investors. The model has two countries and two asset classes (equities
and bonds). It is characterized by imperfect substitutability between assets and allows for en-
dogenous adjustment in interest rates and asset prices. Therefore, it accounts for capital gains
arising from equity price movements, in addition to valuation e¤ects caused by changes in the
exchange rate. To illustrate the mechanics of the model, we calibrate it to analyse the conse-
quences of an increase in the importance of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). Specically, we
ask what would happen if excess reserves held by Emerging Markets were transferred from
central banks to SWFs. We look separately at two diversication paths: one in which SWFs
keep the same allocation across bonds and equities as central banks, but move away from dollar
assets (path 1); and another in which they choose the same currency composition as central
banks, but shift from US bonds to US equities (path 2). In path 1, the dollar depreciates and
US net debt falls on impact and increases in the long run. In path 2, the dollar depreciates and
US net debt increases in the long run. In both cases, there is a reduction in the exorbitant
privilege, i.e., the excess return the US receives on its assets over what it pays on its liabilities.
The model is applicable to other episodes in which foreign investors change the composition of
their portfolios.
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1 Introduction
Reversals in capital inows can have severe consequences for the real economy and the nancial
sector, as the empirical literature on sudden stops illustrates. This explains why global imbalances
are seen as one of the greatest vulnerabilities in the international monetary system. The sustain-
ability of global imbalances has been a major focus of the academic literature on international
nance and is a contentious topic. Some studies (for example, Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sá (2005)
and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2007)) nd that global imbalances will not persist because the United
States must stabilize its external debt level, which would require a large depreciation of the dollar.
Other studies nd that global imbalances can persist for a long period of time because of di¤erences
in nancial market development that make US assets attractive to foreign investors (for example,
Caballero et al (2008) and Forbes (2010)) or because of a persistent return di¤erential between US
and foreign assets - the so-called exorbitant privilege(Gourinchas and Rey (2007)).
The recent nancial crisis exposed severe weaknesses in the US nancial and regulatory system.
It would not have been surprising if investors had responded by reducing their holdings of US
assets. However, while foreign investors did sell US equities and corporate debt during the crisis,
their demand for US government debt increased sharply. This suggests that, even though the crisis
started in the US, investors are still attracted by the safety and liquidity of US assets. Is this
situation likely to continue in the future? Or is foreign investorsappetite for US assets likely to
diminish as US debt levels increase and tighter nancial market regulations are adopted? What
would be the implications for the dollar exchange rate, global imbalances and asset prices of a shift
in the preferences of foreign investors away from US assets?
This paper develops a framework for understanding the implications for the dollar, interest
rates, asset markets and external debt of a shift in the portfolio preferences of foreign investors. It
develops a dynamic general equilibrium model with two regions (the US and the rest of the world
- ROW), each specialized in the production of a di¤erent variety of goods. A distinctive feature
of the model is the presence of two asset classes: equities and bonds. This allows to study the
implications of two types of changes in the portfolio preferences of foreign investors: a reduction
in their preference for US assets and a diversication away from US debt and into US equity
assets. The real exchange rate determines the allocation of goods and assets across the two regions.
Because each region issues both equities and bonds, there are four assets in total: US equities, US
bonds, ROW equities, and ROW bonds. These assets are imperfect substitutes and their demand
follows the specication in Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sá (2005), where the share of wealth invested in
each asset has an exogenous and an endogenous component. The exogenous component represents
shocks to portfolio preferences. The endogenous component captures the reaction of asset demands
to changes in the relative expected returns of di¤erent assets1.
1A growing body of literature derives portfolio holdings from optimization principles in stochastic general equilib-
rium settings (see, for instance, Devereux and Sutherland (2006) and Heathcote and Perri (2007)). For our purposes,
it proves more convenient not to derive portfolio shares from microfoundations. We rather choose to embed in a
general equilibrium framework the specication of asset demands that characterize standard portfolio-balance mod-
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The general equilibrium nature of the model allows for endogenous adjustments in interest
rates and asset prices. Therefore, we can see how they are a¤ected by shifts in the preferences of
foreign investors and what the implications are for the exorbitant privilege. Following any shock
to portfolio preferences, both equity and bond prices adjust to clear asset markets. Over time,
investors rebalance their portfolios in response to changes in expected returns. This endogeneity of
interest rates and asset prices is the key di¤erence between our model and the one in Blanchard,
Giavazzi and Sá (2005), where interest rates are exogenous.
Our model is general enough to be usable for a variety of experiments. It could be calibrated
to countries outside the US. For example, it could be used to study the implications of the sudden
reversals in capital ows that occurred in Iceland and Greece during the global nancial crisis and
to analyse the consequences for other countries with high debt levels if foreign investors were to
withdraw their investment. To illustrate how the model works, we use it to analyse the implications
of an expansion in Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs).
SWFs are government-owned investment funds, set up for a variety of purposes, for example to
transform the income from non-renewable natural resources into a diversied portfolio of assets or
to increase the return on foreign exchange reserves. SWFs are becoming increasingly important in
the international monetary system and are estimated to have between 2:1 and 3 trillion US dollars
of assets under management. While this is relatively small in comparison with total global nancial
assets, estimated at 194 trillion dollars in 2006 (IMF (2008b)), it is a sizable amount and exceeds
the size of hedge funds, estimated at 1:7 trillion dollars. Moreover, SWFs are projected to grow
rapidly in the next decade and to have around 12 trillion dollars of assets under management in
2015 (Morgan Stanley (2008)).
Information about the portfolio structure of SWFs is relatively limited, since there is no uniform
public disclosure of their assets and investment strategies. However, the information available
suggests that the portfolios of SWFs are typically more diversied than traditional reserves held by
central banks, with a larger share invested in equities and a wider geographical dispersion. Given
these di¤erences in investment strategies, a shift of reserve assets from central banks to SWFs
could have implications for asset prices, the ow of funds between countries, exchange rates, and
the evolution of global imbalances. In particular, SWFs may increasingly diversify away from dollar
assets. This might lead to a reduction in capital inows into the US, a depreciation of the dollar
and an increase in returns on dollar assets. SWFs may also diversify their portfolios away from
low-risk, short term debt instruments, and into longer term equity assets, which might lead to
changes in asset prices and rates of return.
It has been argued that the changes in asset returns generated by the growth in SWFs might
els, following Blanchard et al. (2005) and in the spirit of Kouri (1976). The reasons as the following. First, this
allows to match in the calibration international asset holdings observed in the data abstracting from considerations
on the degree of international risk-sharing a crucial issue for portfolio formation which is still largely debated in
the literature. Second in optimal portfolio-choice models, the returns on di¤erent assets coincide in a non-stochastic
steady state. So, adopting that type of model and relying on standard approximation techniques would prevent us
from studying the impact of shifts in preferences of foreign investors on asset return di¤erentials (for instance for the
US exorbitant privilege).
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induce a reduction in the so-called exorbitant privilegeof the US. This term has been used by
Gourinchas and Rey (2007) to denote the fact that the US receives higher returns on its foreign
assets than it pays on its foreign liabilities. This excess return can be decomposed in two elements:
a return e¤ect - within each asset class, the return that the US pays to foreigners is smaller than
the return that foreigners pay to the US; and a composition e¤ect - the US tends to invest more in
foreign equities, while foreigners tend to invest more in US bonds. The growth in SWFs may lead
to a reduction in both components of the exorbitant privilege.
We calibrate the model to match asset holdings and returns observed in the data. We simulate a
scenario where all excess reservescurrently held by central banks in Emerging Market Economies
(EMEs) are transferred to SWFs, where excess reservesare dened as being above the level that
would be required for liquidity purposes. We consider two diversication paths: one in which
SWFs keep the same asset allocation as central banks, i.e., the same investment shares in equities
and bonds, but diversify away from dollar assets (path 1); and another in which they keep the
same currency composition, but shift towards a riskier portfolio in the US market, with a larger
share invested in US equities and a smaller share invested in US bonds (path 2). We focus on the
implications for the dollar exchange rate, the US trade decit and net debt, and the exorbitant
privilege. The main purposes of our analysis are to provide a qualitative assessment of how
changes in portfolio preferences of foreign investors a¤ect asset returns, consumption, investment,
the exchange rate, the trade decit and net debt; to provide a rough quantication of the magnitude
of the adjustment in these variables; and to understand the channels through which these e¤ects
occur.
Our results show that in path 1 (currency diversication) the dollar depreciates in the period
immediately after the shock, leading to a reduction in the US trade decit and net debt. In
subsequent periods, the return on US assets must increase to clear asset markets. This generates
a rebalancing of the portfolios of foreign investors towards holding more dollar assets, which leads
to an appreciation of the dollar. The exorbitant privilegeof the US (the di¤erence between the
return it receives on its foreign assets and the return it pays on its foreign liabilities) decreases,
and US net debt increases over time. In path 2 (asset diversication) the dollar depreciates and
the US trade decit decreases. However, US net debt increases over time due to a reduction in the
exorbitant privilege.
Qualitatively, our results can be compared with the ndings of an exercise conducted by the
IMF (IMF (2008a)). It assumes that between 25 and 50 percent of new foreign currency inows
in countries that have recently established SWFs will be invested by those SWFs. The exercise is
calibrated for two diversied portfolios: one which mimics the composition of Norways Govern-
ment Pension Fund; and another which is based on information on asset allocation and currency
composition provided in market analysis. These two stylized portfolios are compared with a sce-
nario where assets are kept as central bank reserves. The results, derived using the IMFs Global
Integrated Monetary Fiscal Model, suggest that the US real interest rate would increase by 10 to
20 bp, the dollar would depreciate by 2 to 5 percent, and the US current account decit would
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improve by 0:25 to 0:5 pp of GDP. In the rest of the world, real interest rates would fall, currencies
would appreciate, and domestic demand would increase. These results are qualitatively similar to
ours.
This rest of the paper is organized as follows. The structure of the model is explained in section
2. Section 3 presents the baseline parameters used in the calibration and section 4 describes the
scenarios used in the simulations. The results of the baseline simulations are discussed in section
5, while section 6 presents a number of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
This section describes the general equilibrium model. The core structure of the model is based on
Gosh (2007) and Meredith (2007). The model consists of two regions: the US and the rest of the
world (ROW), each fully specialized in the production of one homogeneous good. In each region,
there are two types of assets: equities and bonds. Equities are modelled as claims on the capital
stock. Bonds are issued by the government, who must balance its budget every period.
Each country is populated by a representative rm and two types of representative households:
entrepreneurs and portfolio investors. Firms in both regions produce output using capital and
labour, and adjust their productive capacity by increasing or decreasing their stock of capital. We
abstract from any nominal rigidity and from real economic growth. Entrepreneurs manage the
rms and have all their wealth invested in home equities. Portfolio investors invest in bonds and
equities at home and abroad. They supply labour inelastically and decide on the proportion of their
income to be allocated to consumption and portfolio investment. They receive income in the form
of wages and returns on their portfolio and pay taxes or receive transfers from the government2.
The general equilibrium nature of the model lets any adjustment in interest rates and asset
prices be determined endogenously, as asset demands react to changes in the relative expected
returns of di¤erent assets. The supply of equities is determined by rmsinvestment in physical
capital. Because equity prices are determined endogenously, the model is able to account for capital
gains on equity holdings, in addition to valuation e¤ects caused by changes in the exchange rate.
2We write the model with two types of households to ensure internal consistency. For the model to be internally
consistent, rms should discount future prots using the discount factor of the consumers who manage them. The
steady-state discount factor of portfolio investors is a function of the returns on all assets in which they invest (home
and foreign equities and bonds). However, the discount factor of US rms should equal, in steady-state, the user
cost of capital, which coincides with the rate of return on US equities. If there were only portfolio investors in the
economy, for the discount factor of US portfolio consumers to equal the discount factor of US rms, the steady-state
returns on all four assets (home and foreign equities and bonds) would have to be the same. This would be an
unattractive feature since we are interested in matching the return di¤erential on assets observed in the data. We
solve this problem by including two types of representative households: portfolio investors, who invest in all assets,
and entrepreneurs, who only invest in home equities and manage the rms. The model is internally consistent since
the discount factor of entrepreneurs equals the discount factor of the rms.
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2.1 Consumers
The size of the world population is normalized to 1, with a fraction n in the US and (1   n) in
the rest of the world. There are two types of representative households in each economy: entrepre-
neurs and portfolio investors. Entrepreneurs manage the rms and invest all their wealth in home
equities. Portfolio investors supply labour inelastically, pay lump-sum taxes (or receive transfers),
and invest their wealth in both equities and bonds, at home and abroad. We denote the fraction of
entrepreneurs in the US population by E and the fraction of entrepreneurs in the ROW population
by E.
Both entrepreneurs and portfolio investors decide on how much to consume given their wealth.
US households derive utility from consuming the following CES bundle of US and ROW-produced
goods:
Ct =
n
()1= (CUS;t)
 1
 + (1  )1= (CROW;t)
 1

o 
 1
(1)
where  > 0:5 is a parameter capturing the degree of home bias in consumption and  is the
elasticity of substitution between goods produced in di¤erent regions. Consumption in the ROW
is analogously dened, with starred variables denoting the corresponding quantities consumed by
ROW households.
The consumer price indices can be derived from the households cost minimization problem.
Taking the home good as the numeraire, the consumer price index for the US is given by:
Pt =
n
+ (1  ) e 1t
o 1
1 
(2)
where et is the real exchange rate between the US and ROW, dened as the relative price of
the goods produced in the two regions, so that an increase in the exchange rate represents an
appreciation of the dollar.
The demands of US consumers for domestically and foreign produced goods are obtained from
standard cost minimization subject to 1:
CUS;t =  (Pt)
 Ct (3)
CROW;t = (1  ) (etPt) Ct (4)
An appreciation of the dollar makes ROW goods less expensive to US consumers and US goods
more expensive to ROW households, shifting world demand from US to ROW-produced goods. In
this sense, the real exchange rate determines the allocation of goods across markets.
Consumers optimally decide to allocate their income between consumption and savings. The
utility maximization problem for entrepreneurs is given by:
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max
fCEs g1s=t
: : Et
( 1X
s=t
s t log
 
CEt
)
s:t: : V Et = r
E
t V
E
t 1   PtCEt
where V E represents the nancial wealth of US entrepreneurs, and rEt is the rate of return on their
portfolio dened in local currency. Because entrepreneurs invest all their wealth in home equities,
the rate of return on their portfolio equals the return on home equities.
The utility maximization problem for portfolio holders is given by:
max
fCPs g1s=t
: : Et
( 1X
s=t
s t log
 
CPt
)
s:t: : V Pt = R
P
t V
P
t 1   PtCPt + wt    t
The key di¤erence relative to the problem of entrepreneurs is in the budget constraint, which now
includes wage earning wt net of lump-sum taxes  t. RPt is the rate of return on the portfolio, which
includes home and foreign equities and bonds.
The rst order conditions for utility maximization deliver the standard Euler equations:
1 = Et

Rit+1
PtC
i
t
Pt+1Cit+1

where i = E;P for entrepreneurs and portfolio investors, respectively.
The assumption of logarithmic utility implies that consumption expenditure for entrepreneurs
is optimally determined as:
PtC
E
t = (1  )REt V Et 1
Similarly, for portfolio investors:
PtC
P
t = (1  )

RPt V
P
t 1 +Ht
	
where Ht is the present discounted value of lifetime human wealth, in the form of labour income
net of taxes.
2.2 Firms
Firms in both countries are fully specialized in the production of the regional good, which is available
for consumption and investment in both countries. They produce using a constant returns to scale
technology combining capital and labour. The US production function is given by:
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Yt = AtK

t (Lt)
1 
Yt is the output of the US-produced good, At is an exogenous productivity term, Kt is the capital
input and Lt is the labour input. Since we assume that only portfolio investors supply labour and
that labour supply is inelastic, for the labour market to clear in equilibrium the labour input must
equal the fraction of these investors in the economy, i.e. Lt =
 
1  E. A share  of output is
paid to capital and the remaining is paid to labour.
Firms adjust their productive capacity by deciding the optimal amount of physical investment,
It, so as to maximize current and future cash ows. US rms solve the following problem:
max
fLs;It;Kt+1g
:Et
8<:
1X
s=t
0@ sY
j=t+1

j;j+1

AsK

s (Ls)
1    wsLs   PsIs

1 + 
Is
Ks

  PsKs
1A9=; (5)
s:t: : Ks+1  Ks = Is (6)
where ws denotes the wage,

 IsKs

is the linear homogeneous installation cost of capital,  is the
depreciation rate, and 
j;j+1 the discount factor of US entrepreneurs, used by rms to discount
future cash ows. Ps is the price index of the US investment bundle, which includes US and
ROW-produced goods, built using the same CES aggregator used for the consumption good:
It =
n
1=(IUS;t)
 1
 + (1  )1= (IROW;t)
 1

o 
 1
Standard cost minimization by rms delivers their demands for US and ROW-produced goods:
IUS;t = P

t It (7)
IROW;t = (1  ) (etPt) It (8)
The price of the US investment bundle coincides with the price of the US consumption bundle, Pt,
given by equation 2.
The rmsproblem in equations 5 and 6 can be stated recursively and its rst order conditions
written as:
wt = At (1  )Kt (1  E)  (9)
qt = Pt

1 + 2
It
Kt

(10)
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qt = Et
(

t;t+1
 
qt+1 + At+1K
 1
t+1 (1  E)1    Pt+1 + Pt+1

It+1
Kt+1
2!)
(11)
where qt is dened as the marginal value of capital and coincides with the price of US equities.
Equation 9 determines the wage as the marginal product of labour and equation 10 determines the
optimal amount of investment by US rms. Consistent with the standard q-theory, it implies that
US rms increase their capital stock when the marginal value of capital qt exceeds the replacement
cost of capital Pt. Equation 11 is an arbitrage condition stating that the marginal value of one
unit of capital must be equal to the expected discounted value of returns one period ahead, which
includes capital gains from equity ownership.
The realized gross return on US equities are given by:
rEt =
qt + AtK
 1
t (1  E)1    Pt + Pt

It
Kt
2
qt 1
(12)
Each period US equities pay out the realized marginal product of capital plus capital gains or losses
due to adjustments in the price of equities.
2.3 Government
In each period governments in both regions nance public expenditure and pay out the interest
on the outstanding stock of public debt either by selling new bonds at the current market price
or by levying taxes on home portfolio investors. We follow Meredith (2007) in assuming that
taxation is lump-sum in order to abstract from distortionary e¤ects on capital accumulation. The
US government budget constraint is given by:
Gt +Bt 1 = PBt Bt + (1  E) t (13)
Because taxes are paid only by portfolio investors, the amount of lump sum taxes raised by the
government equals (1 E) t:For simplicity, we assume that Gt and Bt are exogenous and constant
over time. Therefore, a reduction in the price of bonds, PBt , leads to an increase in lump sum
taxes. In addition, we follow Meredith (2007) in assuming that the government consumes only
the domestic good. This is a simplication, but is consistent with the evidence on home bias in
government expenditure.
2.4 Portfolio Allocation
Entrepreneurs manage rms and allocate all their wealth to home equities. Portfolio investors
make two types of decisions regarding their portfolios: they decide on the geographical composition
(how much to invest in US and ROW assets) and on the asset composition (how much to invest
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in equities and bonds). In what follows, all asset returns and prices are measured in units of the
domestic good.
Bonds are issued by the governments in the US and ROW and pay out one unit of the good
produced in the country in which they are issued. Therefore, the rates of return on US and ROW
bonds are:
rBt =
1
PBt 1
and rB?t =
1
PB?t 1
where PB and PB? are the prices of the bonds expressed in US and ROW currencies.
Equities represent the ownership of one unit of capital of US or ROW rms. The rate of return
on US equities is given by equation 12. A similar expression gives the rate of return on ROW
equities, rEt .
We denote by t the share of US nancial wealth invested in US assets. From this, a fraction
t is allocated to equities and a fraction (1  t) is allocated to bonds.3 Similarly, from the share
of US wealth invested in ROW assets, a fraction t is allocated to equities and a fraction (1  t)
is allocated to bonds. The shares for ROW portfolio investors, denoted with a star, are dened
analogously.
Asset demands are characterized by imperfect substitutability between di¤erent assets and
follow a similar specication to the one used in Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sá (2005). They have
two components: an exogenous component, representing shocks to portfolio preferences, and an
endogenous component, capturing the response of asset demands to changes in the relative returns
of di¤erent assets. More specically, t, the fraction of wealth that US investors invest in equities
in the US market, is given by:
t = b

(
Et
 
rEt+1
rBt+1
!
  r
E
rB
)
+ st (14)
where non time-indexed returns denote steady state values. The rst term captures the reaction of
t to changes in expected relative returns: if the return on US equities rises relative to the return on
US bonds, investors allocate a relatively larger fraction of their wealth to equities. The parameter
b captures the degree of substitutability between di¤erent assets (in this case between US equities
and US bonds). A higher degree of substitutability makes portfolio shares more responsive to
changes in expected relative returns. The second term, st , is an exogenous shock to portfolio
preferences.
Similarly, t, the fraction of wealth that US households invest in equities in the foreign market,
is given by:
t = b

(
Et
 
rE?t+1
rB?t+1
!
  r
E?
rB?
)
+ st (15)
3According to these denitions, at time t US portfolio investors invest ttV
P
t dollars in US equities and t(1 
t)V
P
t dollars in US bonds.
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An increase in the return on foreign equities relative to foreign bonds, increases the share of wealth
that US investors invest in equities in the foreign market.4
Turning to the currency composition of portfolios, the share of wealth that US portfolio investors
invest in the domestic asset market, t, is given by:
t = b

(
Et
 
tr
E
t+1 + (1  t) rBt+1
tr
E?
t+1 + (1  t) rB?t+1
 et+1
et
!
  r
E + (1  ) rB
rE? + (1  ) rB?
)
+ st (16)
The share of nancial wealth invested by US portfolio holders in the domestic market is increasing
in the relative expected return on domestic assets, given the proportion of wealth allocated to bonds
and equities in each market. An expected appreciation of the dollar increases the relative return
on dollar assets. Therefore, in our model, the real exchange rate determines not only the allocation
of consumption across US and ROW goods, but also the allocation of wealth across US and ROW
assets.5 6
Given these denitions of portfolio shares, we can express the total rate of return of US portfolio
investors as:
RPt = t 1t 1r
E
t +
(1  t 1) t 1rE?t
et
 et 1+t 1(1  t 1)rBt +
(1  t 1)
 
1  t 1

rB?t
et
 et 1
(17)
Notice that valuation e¤ects stemming from changes in the exchange rate a¤ect the return US
portfolio investors receive on their holdings of foreign assets.
2.5 Equilibrium and Balance of Payments Dynamics
Equilibrium requires goods and asset markets to clear. Combining equations 3, 4, 7, 8, and their
foreign analogues, we can write market clearing conditions for the goods produced in the US and
4The ROW analogues of equations 14 and 15 are:
?t = b
?

Et

rE?t+1
rB?t+1

  r
E?
rB?

+ s?t
?t = b
?

Et

rEt+1
rBt+1

  r
E
rB

+ s?t
Expressing relative returns in deviations from steady state values simplies the calibration of the model without
a¤ecting its dynamics.
5The analogue of equation 16 for the share of ROW wealth invested in ROW assets, ?t , is given by:
?t = b
?

Et

?t r
E?
t+1 + (1  ?t ) rB?t+1
?t r
E
t+1 + (1  ?t ) rBt+1
 et
et+1

  
?rE? + (1  ?) rB?
?rE + (1  ?) rB

+ s?t
6An alternative way to model the portfolio allocation problem would be to choose one of the four assets (for
example, US bonds) to be the reference asset and have investors decide how much to allocate to each asset depending
on its return relative to the reference asset. However, this specication does not allow to di¤erentiate between a shock
to the currency composition (how much to invest in the US versus ROW) and a shock to the asset composition (how
much to invest in equities versus bonds). The specication we adopt for portfolio shares allows us to di¤erentiate
between these two types of shocks: a shock to t changes the asset composition without a¤ecting the currency
composition, while a shock to t changes the currency composition without a¤ecting the asset composition.
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in ROW as:
nAtK

t (1  E)1  = n (Pt)

Ct + Kt + It

1 + 
It
Kt

+
+(1  ?) (1  n)

P ?t
et
 
C?t + K
?
t + I
?
t

1 + 
I?t
K?t

+ nGt
(1  n)A?K?t (1  E)1  = (1  )n (Ptet)

Ct + Kt + It

1 + 
It
Kt

+
+?(1  n) (P ?t )

C?t + K
?
t + I
?
t

1 + 
I?t
K?t

+ (1  n)Gt
Since equity is a claim on the stock of capital, the supply of equities in each region equals the
value of the capital stock in that region. Hence, the market clearing condition for the US equity
market is given by:
(1  E)nttV Pt + EnV Et +
(1  E)(1  n) (1  ?t ) ?tV P?t
et
= nqtKt
This condition states that demand for US equities must equal supply. The rst term on the left
hand side gives the demand for US equities by US portfolio investors. There is a fraction (1 E)n
of these investors in the world population who invest a fraction  of their wealth in US equities.
The second term gives the demand by US entrepreneurs, which equal a fraction En of the world
population and invest all their wealth in home equities. Finally, the third term gives the demand
by foreign portfolio investors, which equal a fraction (1  E)(1  n) of the world population and
invest a share (1  ) of their wealth in US equities.
The market clearing condition for the ROW equity market is similarly given by:
(1  E)n(1  t)tV Pt et + E(1  n)V Et + (1  E)(1  n)?t?tV P?t = (1  n)q?tK?t
The market clearing conditions for the US and ROW bond markets are given by:
(1  E)nt (1  t)V Pt +
(1  E)(1  n) (1  ?t ) (1  ?t )V P?t
et
= nBtP
B
t
(1  E)n (1  t) (1  t)V Pt et + (1  E)(1  n)?t (1  ?t )V P?t = (1  n)B?t PB?t
The net debt position of the US is equal to the value of the stock of US assets, including equities
and bonds, minus the value of nancial wealth of US households:
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Ft = qtKt + P
B
t Bt   (1  E)V Pt   EV Et (18)
The US trade decit equals the di¤erence between total expenditure and total output:
TDt = Pt

Ct + Kt + It

1 + 
It
Kt

+Gt

 A (Kt) (1  E)1  (19)
Using the market clearing conditions for the equity and bond markets, we can rewrite equation
18 as:
Ft =

rEt 
?
t 1 + r
B
t
 
1  ?t 1

Ft 1 + TDt   (1  E)n (1  t 1)V Pt 1  (20)


rE?t et 1
et
t 1 +
rB?t et 1
et
 
1  t 1
  rEt ?t 1   rBt  1  ?t 1
This equation describes the dynamics of US net debt. The two terms on the right hand side are
standard: net debt next period equals the return the US pays on its existing stock of external
net debt plus the trade decit. The last term captures the e¤ect on US net debt of changes in
returns on US assets and liabilities, and embeds valuation e¤ects stemming from exchange rate
adjustments. A higher positive spread between the return on US assets and liabilities implies a
lower accumulation of net external debt. An appreciation of the dollar reduces the dollar value of
the returns the US receives on its foreign assets, contributing to a rise in net debt.
The steady state of the model is characterized by zero physical capital investment (I = I? = 0)
and constant portfolio shares. In steady state the current account of the two regions must be
balanced, and equation 20 reads:

rE? + rB (1  ?)  1F (1 E)n (1  )V P [rE?+rB? (1  ) rE? rB (1  ?)]+TD = 0
We linearize the model to the rst order around the steady state, and solve it using a numerical
linear solver. The next section describes the calibration of the parameter values in steady state.
3 An application: Growth of Sovereign Wealth Funds
3.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model in the steady state to match asset returns and portfolio shares computed
from the data, the ratio of US net external debt to GDP, and the ratio of US and ROW private
consumption to GDP. Table 1 lists all parameter values used in the calibration.
The calculation of the portfolio shares is explained in detail in Appendix A. Consistent with
the evidence in Gourinchas and Rey (2007), the share that US investors allocate to foreign equities
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(56%) is substantially larger than the share that foreign investors allocate to US equities (31%).
In this sense, the US can be characterized as a venture capitalist. The steady state annual gross
rates of returns on di¤erent assets are obtained from Forbes (2010), who presents rates of return
disaggregated by three assets classes: FDI, portfolio equities and bonds. We treat FDI and portfolio
equities as a single asset class and aggregate the returns on FDI and portfolio equities in Forbes
(2010) by weighting them by the proportion of these types of assets on US external assets and
liabilities using the data in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
With this parameterization for asset shares and rates of returns, the model generates an ex-
orbitant privilege equal to 3:85% in steady state. This is close to the value 3:32% computed by
Gourinchas and Rey (2007) for the period 1973-2004. Gourinchas an Rey decompose the privilege
into two components: a return e¤ect, due to the fact that, within each asset class, the US receives
higher returns on its foreign assets than it pays on its liabilities; and a composition e¤ect, due to
the fact that the composition of US portfolio is skewed towards high-yielding equity assets, while its
liabilities are composed mostly of low-yielding debt. Table 2 presents the values for this decomposi-
tion generated by our model in steady state and compares them with the values in Gourinchas and
Rey. We obtain that most of the exorbitant privilege (2:65%) is due to the return e¤ect, consistent
with the ndings in Gourinchas and Rey7.
We normalize the steady state exchange rate and US total factor productivity to 1 for simplicity.
In our benchmark calibration, we set the elasticity of substitution between US and ROW-produced
goods, , to 0:97, which is the median value of long-run price elasticities of aggregate trade ows for
the US and other G7 countries estimated by several studies and reported in Hooper and Marquez
(1995). The parameters capturing the degree of substitutability between assets, b; b?; b; b?; b ;
and b?, are set to 1 following the central scenario in Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sá (2005). As part
of the sensitivity analysis, we check the robustness of our results to changes in  and the b0s.
We set the shares of entrepreneurs in the US and ROW economies, E and E, to equal 20%
and calibrate the relative wealth of entrepreneurs and portfolio holders to equal 20% as well8. We
also impose that the steady state values of the ratio of US net debt to GDP, US consumption to
GDP and ROW consumption to US GDP match the values obtained from the data. Finally, we set
n to equal the ratio of US population to world population, obtained from the US Census Bureau.
7The exorbitant privilege is given by the di¤erence between the return the US receives on its assets and the retun
it pays on its liabilities, namely [rE   + rB  (1   )]   [rE   + rB  (1   )]. The return e¤ect arises from
the di¤erence between the rates of return on assets and liabilities, evaluated at the average portfolio weights, i.e.,
[(rE  rE)  +
2
+(rB  rB)  (1 )+(1 )
2
]. The composition e¤ect arises from the di¤erence between the weights
on equities and bonds for assets and liabilities, evaluated at the average return, i.e., [(   )  rE+rE
2
+ ((1  ) 
(1  ))  rB+rB
2
].
8The share of entrepreneurs is in the range of values commonly used by the literature on nancial frictions and is
close to values observed in the data (0.1-0.2). We tried alternative values for these shares and obtained very similar
results.
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3.2 Shocks to Portfolio Preferences
To study the impact that growth in SWFs is likely to have on asset prices and returns, the level
of US net debt and the dollar exchange rate, we need to make an assumption about the potential
size of SWFs. A natural assumption is that the amount of excess reservesnow held by central
banks will be managed by SWFs in the future. Excess reservesare dened as being in excess of
what would be justied for liquidity purposes. A rule of thumb frequently used to estimate the
size of excess reserves is the Greenspan-Guidotti rule, according to which reserves should cover
short term external debt. Using this rule, we estimate that the amount of excess reservesheld by
central banks in emerging markets is around 3 trillion dollars, about the same as the current size
of SWFs. We use our model to study what will happen if these 3 trillion dollars of excess reserves
are managed by SWFs rather than central banks.
There are two margins along which SWFs may diversify their portfolios relative to central banks:
currency diversication (away from dollars towards other currencies) and cross-asset diversication
(away from bonds towards equities). We consider two paths: one in which the currency compo-
sition changes and the asset composition remains constant (path 1 ), and one in which the asset
composition changes and the currency composition remains constant (path 2 ).
To compute by how much the portfolio shares would change under each of these paths, we need
information on the currency and asset composition of the portfolios of central banks and SWFs. For
the currency composition, we use data from the IMF COFER dataset. For the asset composition,
we use the data reported in IMF (2008a). This information is presented in Table 3. SWFs allocate
a much smaller percentage of their wealth to dollar assets than central banks (38% compared to
60%) and allocate most of their wealth to equities.
3.2.1 Path 1. Shock to Currency Composition
Given the currency composition of the portfolios of SWFs and central banks reported in Table
3, if 3 trillion dollars of excess reservesheld by central banks in emerging markets start being
managed by SWFs, the amount of wealth that foreign investors invest in dollars will be reduced by
(0:6  0:38)  3 = 0:66 trillion dollars. This corresponds to 0:6614:2  100 = 4:65% of US GDP.
In terms of the parameters of our model, this shock can be seen as a reduction in the share of
wealth that ROW portfolio investors invest in the US market, i.e., a reduction in (1   ?). The
change in s

that generates a reallocation of wealth from dollars to other currencies equal to 4:65%
of US GDP is given by:
s
?
=
4:65
100
 US_GDP
(1  n)  (1  E)  V P  E =
0:66
(1  n)  (1  E)  V P  E (21)
The denominator in this expression is total wealth of ROW portfolio investors: there is a
proportion (1   n)  (1   E) of these investors in the world economy, each with wealth equal to
V P. This expression gives us the size of the shock for path 1.
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3.2.2 Path 2. Shock to Asset Composition
A shift of 3 trillion dollars of excess reservesfrom central banks to SWFs reduces the amount that
foreign investors invest in US bonds and increases the amount that they invest in US equities by
(1  0:29)  3  0:6 = 1:278 trillion dollars. This corresponds to 1:27814:2  100 = 9% of US GDP.
In terms of the parameters of our model, this corresponds to an increase in ?, the share of
wealth that ROW portfolio investors invest in equities in the US market. The change in s
?
that
delivers an increase in investment in equities equal to 9% of US GDP is given by:
s
?
=
9
100
 US_GDP
(1  n)  (1  E)  V P  E =
1:278
(1  n)  (1  E)  V P  E (22)
This gives us the size of the shock for path 2.
3.3 Baseline Results
For the baseline results, we calibrate the steady state using the numbers in Table 1. In this section,
we show impulse responses for all the key variables in the model: US and ROW asset prices and
returns, investment, capital stock, GDP, wages, consumption, the exchange rate, US trade decit
and net debt, and the exorbitant privilege. Looking at the full set of impulse responses allows us
to understand the mechanisms through which the shocks operate. For the robustness checks we
focus only on the responses of the exchange rate, US trade decit and net debt and the exorbitant
privilege.
3.3.1 Path 1. Shock to Currency Composition
Given the steady state parameters in Table 1 and our assumption about the size of the shock to
portfolio preferences, equation 21 implies an increase in the share that foreign investors invest in
ROW assets () from 74% to 74:56%. This is a small increase and we should not expect it to
have a large impact. We could assume a larger shock, for example, if we believe that currency
diversication by SWFs will lead to herding behaviour, inducing other investors to also move away
from dollar assets.9
We expect that, as ROW investors shift demand from dollar assets to ROW assets, the price
of US assets should fall and the price of ROW assets should rise. Chart 1 plots the evolution of
the prices of US and ROW assets. There is a reduction in the price of US equities and bonds
and an increase in the price of ROW equities and bonds. Since foreign investors are less willing
to invest in dollar assets, we would expect the return on these assets to rise so that the US can
continue attracting foreign investment and is able to maintain its current account balance. Chart
2 (a) and (b) shows the response of the return on US equities and bonds. The return on equities
includes capital gains or losses arising from movements in equity prices. Because the price of US
equities falls in the rst period after the shock, the return on US equities also falls, but it rises after
9See Corsetti et al (2004) for a model in which a large trader may inuence the actions of small traders.
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that. The return on US bonds rises in response to the shock. The returns on ROW assets decrease
(except in the rst period after the shock), as illustrated in Chart 2 (c) and (d). Because portfolio
shares respond to movements in expected returns, changes in asset returns generate further changes
in the portfolio shares over time. For example, as the expected return on US assets increases and
the expected return on ROW assets falls, US investors invest a larger share of their wealth in US
assets, i.e.,  rises.
Chart 3 (a) to (c) illustrates the response of US investment, capital stock and GDP. Investment is
driven by the marginal value of capital, qt, which coincides with the price of US equities. Therefore,
the evolution of investment in Chart 9 mirrors the evolution of the price of US equities in Chart 1.
Because the price of US equities fall, investment also falls, leading to a reduction in the US capital
stock and GDP. The opposite e¤ects happen in ROW, as shown in Chart 3 (d) to (f).
Chart 4 shows the evolution of wages and consumption in the US and ROW. The reduction in
the capital stock in the US reduces the marginal product of labour, which is equal to the wage.
The wealth of US portfolio investors falls, both because of the fall in the wage and because of the
fall in the return on their portfolio, RPt , given by equation 17. Since there is home bias in portfolio
investment ( > 0:5) and the return on US assets falls, RPt falls. The decrease in the wealth
of portfolio investors leads to a reduction in their consumption. Turning to US entrepreneurs,
they invest all their wealth in home equities. Therefore, the dynamics of their wealth is entirely
determined by the return on US equities, given in Chart 2 (a). This return falls in the period
after the shock due to the capital losses generated by the fall in the price of US equities, but
rises afterwards in order to attract foreign investment and maintain the current account balance.
Thus, consumption of US entrepreneurs falls in the period following the shock and rises afterwards.
Chart 4 (d) shows the evolution of aggregate consumption by US households. This is dominated by
consumption of portfolio holders, since in our calibration they represent 80% of the US population.
For ROW, we obtain the opposite e¤ects on wages and consumption.
The exchange rate is dened as the relative price of US and foreign-produced goods. Its evolu-
tion, shown in Chart 5, is determined by the relative demand for US and foreign-produced goods,
including both consumption and investment demands. Charts 3 and 4 show that investment and
consumption fall in the US and increase in ROW as a result of the shock. Because there is home
bias in consumption and investment ( > 0:5), this implies a reduction in the world demand for
US-produced goods and an increase in the world demand for foreign-produced goods. Therefore,
the exchange rate depreciates following the shock. Given our calibration, we obtain an immediate
depreciation of 0:58%. This is a small e¤ect but it is not surprising given the small size of the shock
that we are assuming. Following this initial depreciation, the exchange rate appreciates again, fol-
lowing the increase in investment in the US and the decrease in investment in ROW. These changes
in investment are driven by the changes in asset prices. As the return in US equities increases to
attract foreign investment back into the US and maintain the current account balance, the demand
for US equities increases, leading to an increase in their price, a recovery in investment and an
appreciation of the dollar.
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Chart 6 shows the evolution of the trade decit, which is obtained as the di¤erence between
total expenditure and total output (equation 19). The dynamics of the trade decit is dominated
by the evolution of consumption in the US and ROW (Chart 4 (d) and (h)). The trade decit
falls signicantly following the shock (by 0:24 percentage points of GDP) and continues falling
afterwards, as US consumers reduce their consumption of both home and foreign-produced goods
and ROW consumers increase their consumption of both varieties of goods.
The evolution of the US exorbitant privilegeis shown in Chart 7. The exorbitant privilege
rises in the period following the shock because capital gains increase the return the US receives on
its investment in ROW equities and capital losses reduce the return the US pays on US equities.
After the rst period the privilege is reduced, as the return the US receives on its foreign assets falls
and the return it pays on its foreign liabilities increases. Table 4 shows the long run decomposition
of the privilege. The spread between the return on US external assets and liabilities falls from
3:85% to 3:7%. This is fully explained by a reduction in the return e¤ect.
The evolution of US net debt is given in Chart 8 and can be explained by changes in the di¤erent
terms in equation 20. The initial depreciation and the reduction in the trade decit leads to a fall
in net debt equal to 1:9 percentage points of GDP. The rapid increase in US net debt in subsequent
periods can be explained by di¤erent factors. First, there is an increase in the return the US pays
on its existing stock of debt, because the returns on US equities and bonds increase. Second, the
reduction in the spread between the return on US assets and liabilities (the exorbitant privilege)
implies a higher accumulation of US net debt over time. Finally, the expected appreciation of the
dollar following the initial depreciation reduces the dollar value of the returns the US receives on
its foreign assets, contributing to a rise in net debt.
3.3.2 Path 2. Shock to Asset Composition
For path 2, we introduce a shock to the asset composition of the portfolios of foreign investors,
assuming that they keep the same share of investment in dollar assets, but diversify away from
bonds into equities. Given the parameter values we chose, equation 22 gives an increase in the
share foreign investors allocate to equities in the US market, , from 31% to 32:11%.
Charts 9 and 10 plot the evolution of the prices and returns of US and ROW assets. Substitution
away from US bonds into US equities by ROW investors leads to an increase in the price of US
equities and a reduction in the price of US bonds. The return on US equities increases in the rst
period after the shock reecting capital gains caused by the increase in the price of equities and
falls in subsequent periods. The return on US bonds rises in order to attract investors and clear
the market for US bonds. The changes in relative asset returns lead to changes in portfolio shares,
generating small movements in the prices and returns of ROW assets. In particular, the decrease on
the expected relative return on US equities versus US bonds reduces the return that US investors
receive when they invest in the US (given that their portfolios at home consist mostly of equities),
leading to a fall in the share of wealth that they invest in the US, . At the same time, foreign
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investors now receive a higher return on their investment in the US, because they moved away from
bonds into higher yielding equities. This induces them to invest a higher fraction of their wealth
in US assets, i.e.,  decreases. In our calibration, the rst e¤ect dominates and demand for ROW
assets increases, leading to an increase in their prices.
Chart 11 plots the response of investment, the capital stock and GDP. As before, the evolution
of investment mirrors the evolution of the price of US equities, given in Chart 9 (a). Investment
rises in the period after the shock, since the increase in demand for US equities drives up their
price. This leads to an increase in the capital stock and GDP. In subsequent periods, investors
rebalance their portfolios again towards bonds, as a response to the increase in the relative return
on US bonds versus US equities. For this reason, the price of US equities falls and investment falls,
leading to a reduction in the capital stock and GDP. The increase in investment in ROW can be
attributed to the increase in the price of ROW equities documented in Chart 9 (c).
The increase in the capital stock in the US raises the marginal product of labour, which is
equal to the wage. In spite of the increase in wages, consumption of US portfolio holders falls
because the reduction in the price of US bonds requires an increase in lump sum taxes in order
for the government budget constraint (equation 13) to be satised. This reduces the wealth of
US portfolio investors. Consumption of US entrepreneurs is driven by the return on US equities,
plotted in Chart 10 (a). Consumption rises in the rst period after the shock and falls in subsequent
periods. Aggregate consumption in the US mirrors the evolution of consumption of US portfolio
holders, since these represent 80% of the US population in our calibration.
The evolution of the dollar exchange rate, given in Chart 13, is determined by the relative
demands of US and ROW-produced goods. We have seen that the shock increases investment
both in the US and ROW in the period after the shock and reduces it in subsequent periods. For
aggregate consumption, we have seen that it decreases in both regions immediately after the shock.
In subsequent periods, aggregate consumption falls in the US and rises in ROW. Because there is
home bias in consumption and investment, this implies a depreciation of the dollar and a reduction
in the US trade decit (Chart 14).
Chart 15 shows the evolution of the US exorbitant privilege. Because foreign investors moved
away from US bonds into higher yielding US equities, the US must pay a higher return on its
liabilities and its exorbitant privilege is reduced. This e¤ect diminishes over time as investors
rebalance their portfolios in response to endogenous changes in asset returns. Table 5 shows the
quantication of the short run and long run e¤ects on the US exorbitant privilege.
The evolution of US net debt, given in Chart 16, can be interpreted by changes in the di¤erent
elements of equation 20. The depreciation of the dollar reduces net debt through two channels: rst,
it reduces the trade decit; second, it increases the dollar value of the return the US receives on its
foreign assets. But there is a counterbalancing e¤ect coming from the reduction in the exorbitant
privilege. The reduction in the spread between the return the US receives on its foreign assets and
the return it pays on its foreign liabilities leads to a higher accumulation of net external debt. In
our calibration, this e¤ect dominates and US net debt increases over time.
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3.4 Robustness checks
3.4.1 Degree of substitutability between assets
To test the robustness of our results to di¤erent assumptions about the degree of substitutability
between assets, we simulate path 1 under di¤erent values of the parameter b. In particular, we
follow Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sá (2005) and set b = 1 and b = 0:1. To show the e¤ect of a very
limited degree of substitutability we also use b = 0:0001.
With a lower degree of substitutability between assets, asset demands are less responsive to
changes in relative returns. Therefore, asset prices and returns have to move more in order for
asset markets to clear. The price of US equities falls by more and the price of ROW equities
rises by more when there is a lower degree of substitutability between assets. Because investment
is driven by the price of equities, a low degree of substitutability increases the divergence in the
response of US and ROW investment. Bond price movements and the consequent scal e¤ects are
amplied as well, which rises the gap between US and ROW consumption. Therefore, the lower
the degree of substitutability between assets, the bigger the drop in the relative demand for the
US and the ROW-produced goods, the bigger the fall in their relative price, and the larger the
depreciation of the exchange rate, as Chart 17 illustrates.
A larger depreciation of the dollar makes the US trade decit fall by more, while more volatile
asset prices amplify movements in the exorbitant privilege, as depicted in Charts 18 and 19. The
higher dollar depreciation, pronounced reduction in the US trade decit, and the higher initial
increase in the privilege associated with low asset substitutability, amplify the initial reduction
in US net debt (Chart 20). Over time, however, US net debt rises by more when the degree
of substitutability between assets is low because the larger reduction in the exorbitant privilege
facilitates a progressive transfer of nancial wealth from the US to ROW.
3.4.2 Elasticity of substitution between goods
We have also looked at the sensitivity of our results to di¤erent values of the elasticity of substitution
between US and ROW-produced goods (). We compare the results obtained for path 1 with
 = 0:97 (the benchmark) and  = 0:6 (following Kollmann (2006)).
The lower the elasticity of substitution between US and ROW-produced goods, the larger the
exchange rate depreciation required to absorb the excess demand for ROW-produced goods that
opens up following a fall in ROW demand for US assets (Chart 21). Since with a low elasticity
of substitution the relative demand for US and ROW-produced goods is less reactive to changes
in their relative price, the depreciation of the dollar generates a smaller reduction in the US trade
decit when  = 0:6 (Chart 22). For this reason, we would expect a smaller reduction in US net
debt when the elasticity of substitutions between goods is low. However, there is an additional
e¤ect which operates through exchange rate valuation e¤ects. The depreciation of the exchange
rate increases the dollar value of the return the US receives on its external assets. This e¤ect is
stronger when  is low because in that case the depreciation is larger. This e¤ect works towards
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reducing US net debt (Chart 23).
4 Conclusions
Our analysis highlights the channels through which changes in the portfolio allocation of foreign
investors may impact on asset prices and returns, consumption, investment, the exchange rate and
net debt. The framework we use allows for endogenous determination of asset prices and returns
and portfolio rebalancing in response to changes in asset returns. In addition, the dynamics of net
external debt incorporates valuation e¤ects arising from movements in the exchange rate.
To illustrate the mechanics of the model, we look at the impact of an expansion in Sovereign
Wealth Funds under two di¤erent scenarios: in one scenario, foreign investors move away from US
assets but keep the same share of investment in equities and bonds; in another scenario, they do
not change the currency composition of their portfolios, but move away from US bonds into US
equities. In the rst scenario, the dollar depreciates in the period immediately after the shock,
leading to a reduction in the US trade decit and net debt. In subsequent periods, the return on
US assets must increase to clear asset markets. This generates a rebalancing of the portfolios of
foreign investors towards holding more dollar assets, which leads to an appreciation of the dollar.
The exorbitant privilegein the US, i.e., the di¤erence between the return it receives on its foreign
assets and the return it pays on its foreign liabilities, decreases, and US net debt increases over
time. In the second scenario, the dollar depreciates and the US trade decit decreases. However,
US net debt increases over time due to a reduction in the exorbitant privilege.
The model is general enough to be applicable to other situations. For example, it could be
used to study the impact of the sudden stop episodes experienced in Iceland and Greece during the
recent global nancial crisis.
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Appendix. Construction of Portfolio Shares
Share of US wealth invested in the US market ()
In the rst quarter of 2008, the value of US nancial wealth was 44:1 US trillion, from Table
L100 in Federal Reserve (2008) The value of US-owned assets abroad was 17:6 US trillion, according
to BEA (2008). Combining this two numbers, the share of US wealth invested in the US market,
, is given by:
 = 1  17:644:1 = 0:60
Share of ROW wealth invested in the ROW market ()
From IMF (2008b), total world nancial wealth in 2006 (equal to the sum of stock market
capitalization and the value of debt securities) was equal to 120 US trillion. Subtracting the
value of US nancial wealth, we obtain a value of ROW nancial wealth equal to 75:9 US trillion.
According to BEA (2008), the value of foreign holdings of US assets in 2007 was equal to 20:1 US
trillion. Therefore, the share of ROW wealth invested in ROW assets () is equal to:
 = 1  20:175:9 = 0:74
Share of US wealth in ROW market allocated to equities ()
Using the data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), we compute the share of US foreign assets
allocated to equities (the remainder is allocated to bonds). The data distinguishes between FDI
and portfolio equities. Because the only di¤erence between the two is the degree of ownership, we
consider them as a single asset class. This gives a value  = 0:56.
Share of ROW wealth in the US market allocated to equities ()
In a similar way, we can use the data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti to compute the share of US
liabilities allocated to equities, which corresponds to the share of ROW assets in the US allocated
to equities. With this calculation we obtain  = 0:31.
Share of US wealth in US market allocated to equities ()
Using data from Table L100 in Federal Reserve (2008), we can construct the overall shares of
wealth that US investors allocate to equities and bonds, considering both the domestic and the
foreign markets. This gives us:
shareUS;E = 0:73
shareUS;B = 0:27
Combining these shares with  and , it is possible to compute the share of US wealth allocated
to equities in the US market, :
shareUS;E =   +   (1  )
0:73 =   0:60 + 0:56  0:40
 = 0:84
Share of ROW wealth in ROW market allocated to equities ()
Data for  is calculated in a similar way to . First, we need to obtain the overall shares of
23
wealth that foreign investors allocate to equities and bonds, considering both the US and ROW
markets. For the Euro Area, we can obtain these shares from Table 3.1 in ECB (2008):
shareEA;E = 0:72
shareEA;B = 0:28
For Japan, we can use data from Bank of Japan (2008):
shareJapan;E = 0:71
shareJapan;B = 0:29
The shares for the Euro Area and Japan are very similar. We take the Euro Area shares as
representative of the ROW:
ROW;E = 0:72
ROW;B = 0:28
Combining these shares with  and , we compute the share of ROW wealth allocated to
equities in the ROW market, :
shareROW;E =   (1  ) +   
0:72 = 0:31  0:26 +   0:74
 = 0:86
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Robustness checks: Degree of substitutability between assets (b)
32
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Robustness checks: Elasticity of substitution between goods ()
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Table 1. Parameter values 
 
Parameter Value Source 
Portfolio shares   Authors’ calculations in 
Appendix A 
Share of US wealth invested in the US 
market 
 
α 
 
0.6 
 
 
Share of ROW wealth invested in the ROW 
market 
 
α* 0.74 
 
 
Share of US wealth in the US market 
allocated to equities 
 
β 
 
0.84 
 
 
Share of ROW wealth in ROW market 
allocated to equities 
 
β* 0.86 
 
 
Share of US wealth in ROW market allocated 
to equities 
 
γ 
 
0.56 
 
 
Share of ROW wealth in the US market 
allocated to equities 
 
γ* 0.31  
Rates of return   Forbes (2008) 
Rate of return on US equities 
 
rE 1.067  
Rate of return on ROW equities 
 
rE* 1.124  
Rate of return on US bonds 
 
rB 1.046  
Rate of return on ROW bonds 
 
rB* 1.049  
Other parameters    
US home bias in goods 
 
ρ 0.7 
 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) 
US capital share 
 
η 
 
0.39 
 
OECD, Annual National 
Accounts 
ROW capital share 
 
η* 0.39 
 
 
Elasticity of substitution between goods 
 
θ 
 
0.97 
 
Hooper and Marquez (1995) 
Depreciation rate 
 
δ 
 
0.05 
 
Meredith (2007) 
Installation cost of capital 
 
φ 
 
6 Gosh (2007) 
Degree of substitutability between assets 
 
b 1 Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sá 
(2005) 
US productivity 
 
A 1 Normalization 
Exchange rate E 1 Normalization 
 
US net debt to GDP ratio 
 
F/Y 0.17 
 
BEA (2008) and IMF 
International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) 
US consumption to GDP ratio 
 
C/Y 0.9 
 
World Bank World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 
ROW consumption to US GDP ratio 
 
C*/Y 2.08 
 
WDI 
Share of entrepreneurs in US economy 
 
αE 0.2 
 
 
Share of entrepreneurs in ROW economy 
 
αE* 0.2  
Relative wealth of entrepreneurs in US 
economy 
 
VE/VP
 
0.2 
 
 
Relative wealth of entrepreneurs in ROW 
economy 
 
VE*/VP* 0.2 
 
 
Relative size of US population 
 
n 0.05 US Census Bureau 
 
 
Table 2. Decomposition of the US exorbitant privilege 
 
 Our calibration Gourinchas and Rey (2005) 
Total 3.85% 3.32% 
Return effect 2.65% 2.45% 
Composition effect 1.2% 0.86% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Table 3. Currency and asset composition of the portfolios of central banks and SWFs 
 
 Central Banks SWFs 
Currency composition   
USD 60% 38% 
Other 40% 62% 
   
Asset composition   
Equities 0% 71% 
Bonds 100% 29% 
Sources: Data on the currency composition of central banks’ reserves is from the IMF 
COFER dataset (numbers for developing countries). Data on the currency and asset 
composition of SWFs’ portfolios is from IMF (2008a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Path 1 (Currency diversification) – Effect on the US exorbitant privilege 
 
 Initial calibration Initial impact (at T=1) Long run impact (at T=100) 
Exorbitant privilege    
Total 3.85% 4.05% 3.7% 
Return effect 2.65% 2.82% 2.5% 
Composition effect 1.2% 1.23% 1.2% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 5. Path 2 (Asset diversification) – Effect on the US exorbitant privilege 
 
 Initial calibration Initial impact (at T=1) Long run impact (at T=100) 
Exorbitant privilege    
Total 3.85% 3.72% 3.8% 
Return effect 2.65% 2.5% 2.7% 
Composition effect 1.2% 1.22% 1.1% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
